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Article 9

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IT’S MORE THAN A CONSTITUTION

MARK R. KILLENBECK*

I. INTRODUCTION
There is a point each semester in my first Constitutional Law class when
many of my students start looking at each other, dismayed by what they are
hearing, and asking, albeit (usually) not aloud, “this boring stuff is con law?”
Much like one of my colleagues—who frequently gushes about “how
wonderful con law is, it’s all the really important stuff”1—initial student
images of the course track closely those that prevail in the body politic.
Constitutional law is abortion (!), and affirmative action (!!), and flag burning
(!!!), and nude dancing (!!!!), and homosexual rights and marriages (!!!!!). It
is, in short, a welter of hot-button issues, invariably involving questions of
individual rights, cases that generate always passionate, occasionally
interesting and important, but all too often dismayingly naive takes on the body
of doctrine we call constitutional law.
I must confess that in that initial class I deliberately lead my students down
the primrose path. The very first case we discuss is Bradwell v. Illinois,2
where Myra Bradwell loses her fight to be admitted to the practice of law in
Illinois. And where Justice Bradley, joined by two of his colleagues, informs
us that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother.”3 This is, he tells us, “the law of the
Creator,”4 and it is entirely appropriate for the people of the state of Illinois,
speaking through their legislature, to reserve the practice of law for men, who

* Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. Many thanks to Joel
Goldstein for asking me to participate in this project. I have a great deal of respect for Joel, who
is both an excellent scholar and coauthor of a fine casebook that does a better than average job of
documenting many of the perspectives I believe important in teaching and thinking about
M’Culloch. See NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO, & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87–90 (4th ed. 2002) (notes on M’Culloch).
1. Actually, the word she uses is “sexy,” but we really shouldn’t put that in the text, should
we?
2. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
3. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Justices Swayne and Field agreed with Bradley.
4. Id.
749
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after all have “that decision and firmness which are presumed to predominate
in the sterner sex.”5
This seems, at least initially, to be great stuff. First class. First case.
Natural law notions of the inherent inferiority of women, now discredited,6 are
trotted out as the appetizer in a constitutional law feast for a group of students
within which women are now, if not in the majority, most certainly close to it.
Bradwell seems then an exemplar of everything students believe a course in
Constitutional Law should and will be: grand issues of individual rights,
playing themselves out within the confines of a text that speaks eloquently of
the “equal protection of the laws.”7
And then the students realize why I have them read, in its entirety, a case
that is generally either ignored entirely in the standard Constitutional Law
casebooks or, if noted at all, mentioned only briefly, invariably to illustrate the
now untenable nature and implications of Justice Bradley’s opinion.8 They
begin to understand that I did not give them Bradwell because I wanted to
initiate a conversation about rights. Or so we can discuss whether it is
appropriate to employ natural law as an interpretive methodology. Or even
because we can use that case to see how much things have changed as matters
of both constitutional law and political faith by fast-forwarding to, say, United
States v. Virginia,9 within which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (gasp!) makes it
clear that stereotypical assumptions about the proper places of women (and
men!) have no place in modern constitutional thought.10
No, the real lessons to be learned from Bradwell, at least for the purposes
of my first class, are about the peculiarities and strictures of a text and a body
5. Id. at 142.
6. Well, mostly. Amidst the normal quotient of outrage and mirth I always see expressions
on at least one or two faces—both male and female—that convey a strong sense of longing for the
good old days, when men were men, and women knew their place.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. For example, neither word of nor about Bradwell appears in the text I use. See WILLIAM
COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS XXXV (11th
ed. 2001) (Table of Cases). It garners only a brief portion of a paragraph in what many regard as
the leading casebook. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 770–71 (15th ed. 2004).
9. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
10. Even Justice Scalia in dissent does not seem to be arguing for such a view. See, e.g., id.
at 566–67 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing prior generations as “close-minded[] . . . with
regard to women’s education,” but arguing that these matters should be left to the people and the
states). Of course, he does append to his opinion the full text of VMI’s “The Code of a
Gentleman,” which informs us, among other things, that “A Gentleman . . . [d]oes not speak more
than casually about his girl friend” and “never discusses the merits or demerits of a lady.” Id. at
602. It’s comforting to know that I will always be able to find this Code in the pages of the
United States Reports. As I can also, for that matter, find and peruse virtually every piece of
patriotic doggerel, flag-division, ever penned. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 422–25
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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of law within which it matters a very great deal what sort of claim a plaintiff is
making, which of the myriad provisions of the document are being applied and
discussed, and whether a court may even hear the claim, notwithstanding the
grand but ultimately illusory notion that, judicially speaking, “[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”11 And so,
rather than exploring grand themes, I ask my students why Myra Bradwell
asserts “that she was a citizen of the United States, and that having been a
citizen of Vermont at one time, she was, in the State of Illinois, entitled to any
right granted to citizens of the latter state.”12 And why she is unable to avail
herself of the protections afforded by Article IV, Section 2, clause 1, which
declares that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” And all sorts of other boring
things that suit my purposes but not, it seems to them, theirs.
For that matter, in each of the next two cases I have them read,13 Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,14 and Katzenbach v. McClung,15 we
devote little if any attention to the realities and evils of racial discrimination.
Rather, the focal point is why Congress used the Commerce Clause, and not
the Fourteenth Amendment, as the predicate for the great civil rights measures
of the 1960s. Those statutes may well address “moral wrongs.”16 But they are
not constitutional because they allow us to combat injustice. Instead, they are
valid because they address “a national commercial problem of the first
magnitude.”17 And while the casebook mentions but does not reprint it,18 I do
not discuss—unless forced to by some irritatingly insistent student—Justice
Douglas’s eloquent concurring opinion, within which he states his “belief that
the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against them
because of race . . . ‘occupies a more protected position in our constitutional
system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state
lines.’”19 After all, let’s not confuse matters with discussions of right and
wrong (not yet, anyway), not when our real interest is in the structure and
requirements of a Constitution within which, at least as matters now stand, the
presence of the word “State” in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment

11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
12. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137 (1872).
13. Albeit not the full reports. Even I have my limits, and my students read only the edited
versions in the casebook.
14. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
15. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
16. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257.
17. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 305.
18. See COHEN & VARAT, supra note 8, at 174.
19. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)).
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imposes a telling limit on the ability of Congress to use that provision as the
constitutional predicate for a civil rights measure that seeks to eliminate both
public and private acts of discrimination.20
The point I try to make in the first class is then that it is imperative that we
pay close attention to the details of the Constitution, that we understand that
each provision within it reflects a deliberate set of choices made by the
individuals who wrote and ratified the core text and its now twenty-seven
amendments, and that much of what really matters in constitutional law
operates at a level far removed from the exalted notions of justice and fair play
the course normally conjures up. I also emphasize that, once we do actually
move from what amounts to an intensive examination of the constitutional
trees to an understanding of the jurisprudential forest within which they grow,
we must strive constantly to keep matters in perspective. Which brings me to
the heart of the matter for the purposes of this Essay, why I find one case,
M’Culloch v. Maryland,21 so fascinating, why I believe it exemplifies virtually
all of the things I think truly matter when teaching Constitutional Law, and
why I try, when teaching that decision, to help my students understand that it is
much more than the Constitution that we will ultimately be expounding.
Unlike Bradwell, M’Culloch is a central fixture in every Constitutional
Law casebook.22 It has been characterized as perhaps “the most important case
in the history of the Supreme Court.”23 Indeed, one study rated it the most
influential opinion ever issued by the Court, a “scientific” judgment reached by
a process that calculated an historical value index for each of the major
decisions of the Court.24 There are some who disagree, arguing that it is an
both an unfortunate decision and overrated.25 But the consensus is that the
20. For an exchange highlighting the continuing importance of the state action limitation, see
and compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619–627 (2000), with id. at 664–66
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In particular, compare id. at 621 (“‘the action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
States’” (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)), with id. at 665 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“But why can Congress not provide a remedy against private actors?”).
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22. One actually devotes an entire chapter to it, treating it as a “case study” that lays the
foundations for much of what follows. See PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN &
AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 7–70 (4th ed. 2000). This casebook is apparently not terribly popular. But I doubt
that its treatment of M’Culloch explains this puzzling fact. Of course, I don’t use it either, but
that has more to do with the needs and attention spans of the students I teach than with the
characteristics of the book itself. See infra text accompanying 53–54.
23. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 441 (1996).
24. Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. Legal
Studies 333, 359 (1998) (Table 6: The Twenty-Five Most Influential Decisions).
25. See, e.g., John Yoo, McCulloch v. Maryland, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, at 241 (WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & SANFORD LEVINSON EDS.
1998) (M’Culloch as “tragic”); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall
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principles for which M’Culloch stands lie at the heart of the American
constitutional order, and that this is one case no course in Constitutional Law
can afford to ignore.
II. M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND
The basic history and holdings of M’Culloch are well-known and easily
summarized. In February, 1818, the state of Maryland passed “An act to
impose a Tax on all Banks or Branches thereof in the State of Maryland not
chartered by the Legislature.”26 While silent in this regard, everyone
understood the measure’s real purpose: to curb the influence of the Baltimore
branch of the Second Bank of the United States in Maryland, perhaps even to
banish it from the state. Soon thereafter, initiating what is regarded as a
deliberate test case, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the
United States, James William M’Culloh,27 issued a series of notes on untaxed
paper. Then, on May 18, 1818, John James, state treasurer for the Western
Shore, brought an action of debt against the Bank to recover $2500 in penalties
owed on five notes. 28
The case, with M’Culloh as the named party on behalf of the Bank,
proceeded quickly through the Maryland courts. The opposing sides agreed on
a statement of facts and the Baltimore county court found that the Bank did
indeed owe the tax. 29 That judgment was affirmed in June in an unreported
per curiam decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals, its highest court. 30
Then, on September 18, 1818, the Supreme Court of the United States placed
the case on its docket, issuing a Writ of Error and setting it for argument in its
February, 1819 Term.
Oral arguments began on February 22, 1819.31 They lasted nine days. The
Court, recognizing that this was a “case involving a constitutional question of
great public importance, and the sovereign rights of the United States and the
State of Maryland . . . dispensed with its general rule, permitting only two
counsel to argue for each party.”32 Thus six individuals came to the podium,
each regarded as one of the very best advocates of the day. The first was
Daniel Webster, who framed the issues on behalf of the Bank. 33 Did Congress
Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1126–44 (2001) (M’Culloch not as “great” as some
would have it).
26. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 317.
27. The astute reader is puzzled: M’Culloh? Isn’t it M’Culloch v. Maryland? More on that
later. See infra notes 123–32 and accompanying text.
28. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 318–19.
29. Id. at 317.
30. Id.
31. On the significance of that date, see infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
32. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 326 n.3.
33. Id. at 322.
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in fact have the power to create the Bank? If it did, could the state of
Maryland impose its tax? And if indeed the Bank was constitutional, and the
tax improper, what were the implications of these holdings for a fledgling
nation that was still struggling to define and understand the implications of its
unique federal structure? Webster was followed by the first attorney appearing
for Maryland, Joseph Hopkinson, then by William Wirt, the current Attorney
General of the United States, Walter Jones, for Maryland, and Luther Martin,
the Attorney General of Maryland.34 The last to speak was William Pinkney,
whose three day-long defense of the Bank prompted Justice Story to observe
that “I never, in my whole life, heard a greater speech.”35
Webster would fume about the length of the argument.36 But he
presumably had no complaint about the speed with which the Court acted. For
it took just three days for Chief Justice John Marshall to prepare his opinion
for a unanimous Court, which he delivered on Saturday, March 6.37
“In the case now to be determined,” he began, “the defendant, a sovereign
state, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the Union,
and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of an act which has been
passed by the legislature of that state.”38 Maryland insisted that “[t]he power
of establishing corporations is not delegated to the United States, nor
prohibited to the individual states,” and was, therefore, “reserved to the states,
or to the people.”39 But Maryland was wrong. Congress did indeed have the
authority to create the Bank. The fact that such a power was not expressly
mentioned in the text did not matter. A constitution, Marshall observed, could
not possibly “contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution,” lest it “partake of the prolixity of a legal code” that “could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind.”40 The powers of the national
government were accordingly both express and implied, and the test to be
invoked an arguably simple one: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are

34. Id.
35. Letter from Joseph Story to Stephen White (Mar. 3, 1819), in WILLIAM W. STORY, 1
LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 324, 325 (Boston, C.C. Little & J. Brown, 1851).
36. Letter from Daniel Webster to William Sullivan (Feb. 25, 1819), in THE PAPERS OF
DANIEL WEBSTER: 1 CORRESPONDENCE, 1798–1814, 249 (Charles M. Wiltse & Harold D. Moser
eds., 1974) (“The Bank cause is not heard thro. yet . . . I am grown impatient to be off.”).
37. I discuss one aspect of the speed with which the decision was rendered infra notes 69–71
and accompanying text.
38. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 400.
39. Id. at 374 (argument of Luther Martin, Attorney General of Maryland).
40. Id. at 407.
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plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”41
Maryland, in turn, could not interfere with the Bank’s activities by
exercising its authority to tax. That power, Marshall admitted, was “one of
vital importance” that had clearly been “retained by the States” in the wake of
ratification.42 But “the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are
supreme.”43 And since “the power to tax involves the power to destroy,”44 a
state’s exercise of that sovereign prerogative must necessarily yield in the face
of the considered judgment of the nation that a national bank was both
necessary and proper.
“Such a tax,” Marshall concluded, “must be
unconstitutional.”45
For most students then, M’Culloch stands for a few simple but important
propositions. The most important of these, and the one for which the case is
usually cited, is the doctrine of implied powers, that is, that the federal
government is not limited to the exercise only of those powers specifically
enumerated in the text of the Constitution. M’Culloch also recognizes, in no
uncertain terms, that when the federal government has acted in a
constitutionally permissible way its actions are supreme and may not be
questioned or otherwise interfered with by the states. And we find in
Marshall’s opinion a series of understandings about the nature and scope of
judicial review, one of which was then and is now extraordinarily important:
the assumption that, in the normal course of events, the Court will defer to the
judgments of Congress when that body enacts a “law [that] is not prohibited,
and is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the
government.”46
I could accordingly teach M’Culloch by having my students read the edited
version of the decision that appears in their casebook and extract from it,
hopefully with their help, the three principles just mentioned.47 That approach
would not, however, do either the case or the students (dare I say this?) justice.
It would give them what they need for the purposes of moving forward in the
course. But it would deny them both important perspectives on what Marshall

41. Id. at 421.
42. Id. at 425.
43. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 426.
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id. at 437.
46. Id. at 423.
47. As Professors Balkin and Levinson note, see J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The
Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 974 n.44 (1998), only one casebook,
theirs, see BREST ET AL., supra note 22, gives the student the full text of the decision. And even
they do not provide the full report of the case, which includes a brief summary the facts,
M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 317–22; summaries of the arguments of all six counsel, id. at 322–400; and
Marshal’s opinion and judgment, id. at 400–37.
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and his colleagues accomplished and a full understanding of why the case
merits the acclaim it has garnered. It would also ignore the political and social
movements within which the events that led to M’Culloch transpired, contexts
that have assumed considerable importance in a twenty-first century within
which many of the issues posed in the early years of the nineteenth now recur.
There are any number of arguments I could make to illustrate why I
believe M’Culloch is important and what I think it tells us about teaching
Constitutional Law. In the interests of brevity, I will limit myself to two. But
before doing so, in the interests of candor, I note the following.
First, my views regarding M’Culloch are hardly unbiased. I am under
contract to write what will be—if I ever finish it—the first detailed, booklength discussion of that case.48 I have also written one of the relatively few
law review articles that focuses on that decision and its implications,49 have
contributed a piece on M’Culloch to one edited volume,50 and have completed
a similar piece for another.51 And I also discussed the Bank in some detail in
an earlier article.52 In certain respects then this Essay might be seen as an
exercise in shameless self-promotion. Of course, the fact that I have done and
am doing this work is also presumably why I was asked to participate in this
project and in particular use, if I chose to do so, M’Culloch as my focus. So I
at least hope, and in most ways expect, that this bit of drum-beating will be
excused.
Second, even I do not cover everything I believe important about
M’Culloch when I teach that case. Indeed, I don’t usually include or discuss
many of the things I am about to set out in this itself truncated treatment in that
segment of the single class within which we read and explore M’Culloch.53
48. That carefully qualified claim reflects the fact that there is one, and only one, scholarly
book devoted to M’Culloch. See JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND
(Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter MARSHALL’S DEFENSE]. My volume will be titled
SECURING THE NATION: M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND, and will published as part of the University
Press of Kansas series Landmark Law Cases and American Society.
49. Mark R. Killenbeck, Madison, M’Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cognizance: Some
Thoughts on the Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901 (2002).
50. Mark R. Killenbeck, James William McCulloh: The Second Bank of the United States, in
ONE HUNDRED AMERICANS MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY
134 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2004). When I wrote this I embraced the spelling “McCulloh.” I
have now changed my mind. See infra notes 123–32 and accompanying text.
51. Mark R. Killenbeck, M’Culloch v. Maryland, in THE PUBLIC RESPONSE TO
CONTROVERSIAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., forthcoming 2005).
52. Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great Experiment: Reserved Powers in a PostRatification, Compound Republic, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 117–27.
53. I should note that at Arkansas Constitutional Law is a required, four credit-hour course
that covers all of the usual subjects for such a course, with the single important exception of the
First Amendment, which is relegated to a separate three credit-hour elective. I have of late taught
Con Law twice a week in two, two-hour classes. Hence, the reality is that M’Culloch occupies
one portion of what is usually the fifth class of the semester.
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Most of the students I teach are not interested in grand constitutional theory or
historical details. They want to master what they need to know to pass the bar
examination. And within that, their particular interest is in the so-called black
letter rules. There are exceptions. Like most state law schools, our students
are a mix of high and low achievers with a variety of backgrounds and
interests. Our best students compare favorably with those at virtually any of
the forty-plus law schools that believe themselves to be one of the top ten or
fifteen such institutions in the nation. Thus, the realities of what I teach, where
I teach, and who I teach are such that what follows is an ideal assessment,
rather than a declaration that this is in fact what I invariably do when I teach
M’Culloch.54
III. M’CULLOCH’S CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE
I begin with a point made earlier: the importance of the case and decision.
Professors Balkin and Levinson characterize Marshall’s opinion as “a legal
document that generates no contention at all” and observe that “[a]t least
within the field of constitutional law, almost everyone seems to agree that
McCulloch is canonical.”55 And while they note an ironic dimension to all of
this—the fact that “articles about McCulloch rarely appear in American law
reviews”56—this amounts to a quibble about how we determine a decision is
central to the subject, rather than whether the judgment that it is essential is
valid. Critics in turn dispute both its significance and wisdom. Professor
Klarman, for example, argues that M’Culloch exemplifies “an interesting and
relatively underexplored question,” the “belief . . . that Supreme Court
decisions are more consequential than they plausibly could be.”57 Professor
Yoo in turn describes it as a constitutional “tragedy,” believing that “[i]n the
course of that decision, Marshall gave voice to an expansive reading of [the
Necessary and Proper] clause that bestowed upon Congress broad powers that
the Framers never contemplated.”58
Now, I do not for a minute believe that these brief comments do justice to
the points Professors Klarman and Yoo make. I could—and will at some
point, in some other venue—both examine their critiques more fully and take
issue with many aspects of what they have to say. Rather, I assume for the
sake of argument that much of what they say is correct and posit that we

54. At least when I teach it in our core course. I have a seminar on the case in the works.
55. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 47, at 973.
56. Id. at 974–75. They’re right. There are only a handful of articles devoted to the case,
and (so far!) only one book. Rather than padding this footnote with a list, I leave it to the reader
to try and recall them.
57. Klarman, supra note 25, at 1182.
58. Yoo, supra note 25, at 243–44.
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should still conclude that M’Culloch is both an extraordinarily important
decision and a great case to teach.
For example, Professor Klarman is surely correct when he observes that
“with regard to the concrete issue involved in McCulloch—the
constitutionality of the national bank—the decision was completely
unexceptionable.”59 He notes, as do some but not all of the casebooks, a
number of interesting pieces of evidence in support of this contention. One,
which he mistakenly identifies as a statement by “now-President James
Madison . . . as he signed the Bank recharter,”60 is found in the message
Madison issued when he vetoed the first such measure to reach him in January
1815. The question of constitutionality, Madison observed, was
“[w]aiv[ed] . . . as being precluded in my judgment by repeated recognitions
under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied
by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the
nation.”61 A second example is found in the opening passages of Marshall’s
opinion for the Court, where he states:
It has been truly said, that this can scarcely be considered as an open
question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation
respecting it. The principle now contested was introduced at a very early
period of our history, has been recognised by many successive legislatures, and
has been acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy,
as a law of undoubted obligation.62

The judgment that the Bank was constitutional was not universal.
Maryland clearly did not agree and, as the post-decision reaction would
demonstrate, there were any number of others who shared these reservations.
Nevertheless, Madison and Marshall were largely correct: In 1819 virtually all
informed and objective observers believed that the constitutional question,
which had been argued at length and with passion in both 1791 and 1811, had
now been resolved. But for our purposes two aspects of the Madison and
Marshall statements are of special interest.
The first is that each seems to be acknowledging the importance of
judgments reached by other actors in the constitutional system. Madison
“waives” the question, recognizing, as he would note many years later, that
there was “evidence of the Public Judgment, necessarily superseding
59. Klarman, supra note 25, at 1128–29.
60. Id. at 1129.
61. James Madison, Veto Message, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 327, 327
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908) [hereinafter MADISON’S WRITINGS]. Madison goes on to discuss his
purely practical objections to the measure, which provided the bases for his veto. See id. (noting
the details of the proposal before him do not indicate that “the proposed bank . . . appear[s] to be
calculated to answer the purposes” for which it is being created).
62. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
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individual opinions.”63 Marshall in turn speaks of “[a]n exposition of the
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts” that “ought not to be
lightly disregarded.”64 And he notes that the question of constitutionality was
debated “in the executive cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any
measure has ever experienced, and being supported by arguments which
convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast, it became
a law.”65
We live in an age where numerous commentators postulate and lament a
Supreme Court that has, in their estimation, arrogated to itself the role of sole
arbiter of the Constitution. Like many of the issues to which I allude in this
Essay, this is a matter of considerable importance and one that can and should
be examined at length—somewhere else. For present purposes, it is enough to
note both the significance of Madison and Marshall’s sweeping statements
about the manner in which constitutional interpretation transpires and the value
they have as teaching tools.
For example, we know, both because Marshall himself once told us,66 and
because the current Court continually reminds us,67 that questions of
constitutionality are ultimately resolved by the Court. That simple rule does
not, however, exhaust the subject. It tells us very little about what sort of
information the Court should consider, much less find persuasive. M’Culloch,
writ large, helps us answer these questions. We can, for example, because the
report of the case provides them,68 compare Marshall’s final work product with

63. Letter from James Madison to N. P. Trist (December, 1831), in 9 MADISON’S WRITINGS,
supra note 61, at 471, 477.
64. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 401.
65. Id. at 402. The minds to which he refers are those of James Madison, Edmund
Randolph, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton. See James Madison, The Bank Bill, in 13
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 372 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981)
(Madison’s remarks in the House of Representatives) [hereinafter MADISON, The Bank Bill];
Edmund Randolph, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill (Feb. 12, 1791), in H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 3 (1999) (Attorney General
opinion); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a
National Bank, in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974)
(opinion provided as Secretary of State); Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 97 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1965) (opinion provided to Washington
as Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter HAMILTON, Final Version]. Marshall would also
presumably include George Washington in this list, who as President signed the bill creating the
First Bank.
66. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 138, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
provinces and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
67. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Congress’ discretion is
not unlimited . . . and the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.”).
68. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 322–400.
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the summaries of the arguments presented by the six men who appeared before
the Court. That is an important exercise, for it allows us to see the extent to
which a lengthy opinion, issued only three days after oral arguments
concluded, borrowed from or was influenced by what actually transpired when
the case was presented. Beveridge states that “it seems not unlikely that much
of [the opinion] had been written before the argument.”69 That may be. But
careful examination of the opinion and the summaries of oral argument give
every indication that Marshall paid close attention to what was presented.
Full details of such an exercise, mercifully, belong elsewhere, and the one
example I now offer must suffice. In his argument before the Court, Webster
observed that “[a]n unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to
destroy; because there is a limit beyond which no institution and no property
can bear taxation.”70 In Marshall’s hands this becomes one of the most notable
and noted passages in the opinion:
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to
destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain
repugnance, in conferring on one government a power to control the
constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very
measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are
propositions not to be denied.71

We do not know for a fact that Marshall’s words were provoked by
Webster’s. But the comparisons are worth making, and the questions worth
asking.
We can also compare the Marshall opinion to prior discussions of the
constitutional matters it explores. Perhaps the most important example of this
is the opinion Hamilton wrote for President Washington when the Bank bill
was debated in the Cabinet in 1791. Hamilton argued that a
general principle is inherent in the very definition of Government and essential
to every step of the progress to be made by that of the United States; namely—
that every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and
includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and
fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power; and which are
not precluded by restrictions & exceptions specified in the constitution; or not
immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society.72

69. 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL: THE BUILDING OF THE NATION
1815–1835, at 290 (1919).
70. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 327.
71. Id. at 431.
72. HAMILTON, Final Version, supra note 65, at 98. Hamilton’s reference to matters
“immoral” is interesting because a sense of moral outrage may well have colored Madison’s
reaction to the Bank bill. See JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 95 (2d ed. 2002) (noting Madison’s “disgust” with “fevered speculation in
public securities and bank notes”).
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For Hamilton, a Bank had “a natural relation to . . . the acknowledged objects
[and] lawful ends of the government.”73 The Necessary and Proper Clause, in
turn, should be given an expansive reading. Both the “grammatical” and
“popular sense” of the word “necessary,” for example, supported the
conclusion that a given act needed simply to be that which “the interests of the
government or person require, or will be promoted, by the doing of this or that
thing.”74 The determinative constitutional criterion thus became
the end to which the measure relates as a mean. If the end be clearly
comprehended within any of the specified powers, & if the measure have an
obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of
the constitution—it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the
national authority.75

These are not, of course, Marshall’s precise words in M’Culloch. But they
are virtual mirror images of what he did write, providing an important and
interesting bridge between the events of 1791 and those of 1819.
The second notable aspect of the Madison and Marshall statements is their
inclusion of the judiciary within the list of actors who had debated and
resolved the constitutional question, in particular Marshall’s reference to
“cases of peculiar delicacy.”76 Neither Madison nor Marshall identified which
cases they had in mind. But I suspect their logic was the same as that of
Representative Robert Wright of Maryland, who noted during the 1816 debate
on the bill to recharter the Bank that “the supreme judicial tribunal had decided
on its constitutionality, by often recognising it as a party, and it was now too
late to insist on the objection.”77
One such case was The Bank of the United States v. DeVeaux,78 which
arose, ironically, when the Bank refused to pay a tax that the state of Georgia
attempted to levy on its stock. In yet another Marshall opinion, the Court held
“that the right to sue,” conferred on the Bank in its original charter, “does not
imply a right to sue in the courts of the union, unless it be expressed,”79 and
that the citizenship of a corporation is determined by “the character of the
individuals who compose” it.80 The Bank’s attempts to avoid the tax were,
accordingly, defeated. The Court had no jurisdiction. The Bank could not
bring a federal question action, and could not maintain one in diversity, given
73. HAMILTON, Final Version, supra note 65, at 100.
74. Id. at 102.
75. Id. at 107.
76. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 401.
77. LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 709
(M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) [hereinafter Clarke &
Hall] (statement by Representative Robert Wright on the House floor, April 5, 1816).
78. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
79. Id. at 86.
80. Id. at 92.
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the strictures imposed by the rule of complete diversity.81 Marshall did not
discuss whether the Bank itself had been constitutionally created. But he did
lay the foundations for key aspects of what was to follow in M’Culloch,
observing that “[a] constitution, from its nature, deals in generals, not in detail.
Its framers cannot perceive minute distinctions which arise in the progress of
the nation, and therefore confine it to the establishment of broad and general
principles.”82
That formulation did not, obviously, have the ring or staying power of
Marshall’s subsequent admonition that a constitution cannot “partake of the
prolixity of a legal code.”83 But it does add telling force to the idea that much
of the constitutional thought set forth in M’Culloch is not original. For that
matter, in another early decision, United States v. Fisher,84 Marshall outlined
much of what would follow regarding the nature and reach of the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
Fisher was a bankruptcy action, and the specific question before the Court
was “whether the United States, as holders of a protested bill of exchange . . .
are entitled to be preferred to the general creditors, where the debtor becomes
bankrupt?”85 The debtors objected, arguing “[t]hat if the act of congress gives
the preference to the extent claimed, it is unconstitutional, and not a law.”86
Marshall’s discussion of this issue in Fisher reads like a primer for M’Culloch.
He begins by noting that “[i]n the case at bar, the preference claimed by the
United States is not prohibited; but it has been truly said that under a
constitution conferring specific powers, the power contended for must be
granted, or it cannot be exercised.”87 His response, which I quote at length for
obvious reasons, is as follows:
It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

81. That rule, of course, being one that the Court recognized three years earlier when it held
that that is what Congress intended when it implemented diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary
Act of 1789. See Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
82. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 87.
83. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
84. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
85. Id. at 385. The use of the plural here (“United States . . . are”) is interesting. One of the
major debates of the time, and a central element in the post-M’Culloch dialogue, was about
whether the Constitution created a nation or simply a confederation of sovereign states.
Marshall’s use of the plural here is arguably at odds with the position he would subsequently
stake out in M’Culloch and defend vigorously in its wake. See infra notes 104–06 and
accompanying text.
86. Id. at 371.
87. Id. at 396.
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In construing this clause it would be incorrect and would produce endless
difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized
which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power.
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be said
with respect to each, that it was not necessary because the end might be
obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means, and
must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the
exercise of a power granted by the constitution.88

Marshall then dismisses the argument that the federal measure “interfere[s]
with the rights of the state sovereignties respecting the dignity of debts.”89
This is, he declares, “an objection to the constitution itself.”90 And he states
that “[t]he mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the necessary
consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects
to which the legislative power of congress extends.”91
Once again, Marshall’s subsequent statements are the ones we remember,
or at least they are the ones we all teach.92 Is that incorrect? Is M’Culloch
simply a reprise of what has come before, albeit a more eloquent one?
If our focus is simply on the constitutional trees, then the answer to that
question might well be yes. But it is important to understand that M’Culloch
was litigated and decided at a crucial juncture in American history. For
example, while there was indeed a general consensus that the measure creating
the Second Bank was constitutional, the fact that the Marshall Court would
place its imprimatur on that institution was significant given events that had
begun to engulf that institution. Moreover, the Court’s opinion contained any
number of statements that, while arguably obiter dicta, were especially
significant given the political realities of the time and the spectre posed by one
issue in particular, slavery.
The focal point for M’Culloch was, of course, the Second Bank of the
United States. That institution was arguably misnamed. As Joseph Hopkinson
would observe during oral argument, “[i]s it then exempt, as being a bank of

88. Id.
89. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 396–97.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Court reversed the decision of the circuit court. Justice Washington, while
noting that “I take no part in the decision of this cause,” explained at length why he believed the
lower court’s construction of the applicable statutes was correct. Id. at 397–405. He did not,
however, address or dispute Marshall’s discussion of the constitutionality question.
92. The casebooks tend to ignore both Deveaux and Fisher. The only reference found in any
of the three I have used for the purposes of this Essay is in SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 8,
where Fisher is noted and quoted, briefly, as a decision that “gave support to” and “anticipated
[Marshall’s] more elaborate discussion in McCulloch.” See id. at 103 & n.3. Interestingly, the
one casebook that treats M’Culloch in the sort of depth I believe appropriate, BREST ET AL., supra
note 22, mentions neither.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

764

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:749

the United States? How is it such? In name only.”93 He was correct. The
Bank was a private corporation, of which the United States held only one-fifth
of the stock and appointed only five of its twenty-five directors.94
Nevertheless, the relationship between the federal government and the Bank
was such that it was appropriately named. And, given the manner in which it
was viewed by the states, and the contexts within which the debate about
constitutionality transpired, it was equally appropriate for Marshall and his
colleagues to characterize and treat it as they did.
Both the First and Second Bank were important institutions that played a
pivotal role in the development of the nation.95 They were also intensely
controversial, both as a matter of general policy and, in particular for the
Second Bank, actual operations. Part of the opposition to the Bank was
principled, reflecting deep-seated reservation about banks in and of themselves
and about the implications of a nominally federal bank for states that viewed
themselves as distinct and coequal sovereigns in a federal compact, rather than
as constituent members of a national union. Equally important, however, were
concerns about the Bank itself, in particular about the extent to which its
policies had either created or exacerbated the severe economic dislocations that
eventually became known as the Panic of 1819.96
When the Second Bank began to do business in January 1817, the
economy was inflationary but generally sound. But the Bank’s desire to
compete with established state banks, and its attempts to assume what its
directors believed to be its rightful role as the primary engine for economic
growth, led it to make too many loans for paper currency, unbacked by specie
(gold and silver). When commodity prices fell sharply in 1818, the
combination of inflation and indebtedness overwhelmed the system. By 1819
more than three million individuals—one-third of the population—were
feeling the effects of the resulting depression. The Bank, however, seemed
insensitive to the situation, demanding repayment of its debts at precisely the
moment it had become most difficult to do so.

93. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 339 (1819).
94. See An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, 3 Stat. 266,
266 (1816) (setting a capital of $35 million, of which $7 million came from the United States); id.
at 269 (creating a board of twenty-five directors, of whom five “shall be annually appointed by
the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”).
95. The classic study is BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957). For discussions of the Bank itself, see RALPH C. H.
CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES (1902); EDWARD S. KAPLAN, THE
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1999); WALTER BUCKINGHAM
SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
96. See generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE PANIC OF 1819: REACTIONS AND POLICIES
(1962).
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The Bank did not cause the Panic in any meaningful sense. But its policies
did exacerbate an already tenuous situation. More to the point, rumors of
corruption and mismanagement began to surface, reinforcing the perceptions
of an already skeptical public that the Bank was the enemy. Questions were
raised about the Bank in Congress in the fall of 1818, and in the House a
committee was appointed to investigate. It issued a report on January 16,
1819, within which the Bank’s management was accused of violating the
Bank’s charter, mismanaging its affairs, and engaging in inappropriate
speculation.97 That report did not recommend any specific actions or
sanctions, believing that “the salutary power lodged in the Treasury
Department will be exerted, as occasion may require, and with reference to the
best interests of the United States.”98 But various members of the House were
not satisfied and argued, ultimately unsuccessfully, that the Bank’s charter
should be repealed. This provoked an extended debate that began on February
18, four days before the Court took up M’Culloch, and ended on February 25,
during the arguments themselves.
The Bank’s role in precipitating the emerging financial crisis was then
clearly on everyone’s mind when the case was argued, as was the growing
story of fraud and abuse. The full details of what was wrong with the Bank,
and in particular its Baltimore branch, had not emerged at the point M’Culloch
was decided. But the alarm had been raised, and the realities surrounding the
Bank could not have escaped Marshall and his colleagues. Their willingness to
issue a ringing endorsement of an institution that was at that point viewed with
considerable suspicion is then an aspect of the decision that is both worth
noting and makes it especially noteworthy.
The reaction to the decision was immediate (as matters went those days)
and intense. Individuals and newspapers of a nationalist bent applauded the
decision. One Washington newspaper observed that “[t]he Supreme Judicial
authority of the Nation has rarely, if ever, pronounced an opinion more
interesting in its views, or more important as to its operation, than that recently
given, as to the right of a state of the Union to tax the National Bank.”99 But,
as virtually all of the casebooks note, M’Culloch was greeted with outrage in
some quarters, especially in areas where either banking, or the federal
government, or both, were viewed with suspicion. In Virginia in particular the
press would lament “the alarming errors of the Supreme Court of the United

97. Report of the committee appointed to inspect the books, and to examine into the
proceedings of the Bank of the United States (Jan. 16, 1819), reprinted in CLARKE & HALL,
supra note 77, at 714–32.
98. Id. at 732.
99. WASH. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 13, 1819, at 3.
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States” and declare that “[w]henever state rights are threatened or invaded,
Virginia will not be the last to sound the tocsin.”100
Sound they did. Spencer Roane, a judge on the Virginia Court of Appeals
and bitter foe of Marshall, mounted a broad attack on the decision in a series of
four essays published in the Richmond Enquirer under the pseudonym
“Hampden,” within which he complained of a judicial conception of federal
“legislative power which is every where extending the sphere of its activity
and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”101 And John Taylor of
Carolene, in a book-length work published in 1820, asked “[w]hich can do
most harm to mankind, constructive treasons or constructive powers?”102 For
Taylor the answer was, of course, the latter, that is, the Court in general and
M’Culloch in particular, for “[t]he first takes away [only] the life of an
individual, [while] the second destroys the liberty of a nation.”103
These assaults on the Court did not go unanswered. Indeed, Marshall
himself—in an extracurricular exercise that seems at least curious if not
shocking by current standards—would enter the lists in a series of articles
written under the pseudonyms “A Friend to the Union” and “A Friend to the
Constitution.” The heart of the matter for him was his belief that the views
expressed by Roane and his allies suffered “from the fundamental error, that
our constitution is a mere league, or a compact, between the several state
governments, and the general government.”104 He warned that “the principles
maintained by” the opponents of M’Culloch “would essentially change the
constitution, render the government of the Union incompetent to the objects for
which it was instituted, and place all of its powers under the control of the state
legislatures. It would, in a great measure, reinstate the old confederation.”105
Such a state of affairs would lead “to the utter subversion of the constitution,”
such “that [the] grand effort of wisdom, virtue, and patriotism, which produced
it, will be totally defeated.”106
These exchanges were, obviously, about more than the Bank. The also lay
at the heart of the American constitutional experience. Questions about the
nature and structure of the nation, and in particular the role of the states within
that nation, are as old as the text itself and lie at the heart of the federalism

100. RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Mar. 30, 1819, at 1.
101. Spencer Roane, Hampden No. I, in MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra note 48, at 107, 108.
102. JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 22
(Richmond, Shepherd & Pollard 1820).
103. Id. at 22–23. Taylor also expressly linked M’Culloch to an issue that would divide the
nation in far more profound ways, slavery. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
104. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. VIII, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 353, 354 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995).
105. Id.
106. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. IX, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 359, 363.
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decisions of the Rehnquist Court. As are quarrels about another aspect of
M’Culloch that assumed increasing importance in the wake of that decision:
the nature and scope of judicial review itself.
For example, Madison agreed with Roane and his colleagues that
M’Culloch posed serious questions for those devoted to state sovereignty. But
Madison was also deeply concerned about what M’Culloch implied about the
role of the Court. In a letter to Roane a few weeks after the decision he
focused virtually all of his attention on “the single question concerning the rule
of interpreting the Constitution” and the Court’s role in that process.107 He
asked “[d]oes not the Court relinquish by their doctrine, all controul on the
Legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers?”108 Madison believed that
Marshall’s opinion signaled that “the expediency & constitutionality of means
for carrying into effect a specified Power are convertible terms; and Congress
are admitted to be Judges of the expediency.”109 This, he believed, largely
removed the Court from the Constitutional equation, for “a question, the
moment it assumes the character of mere expediency or policy . . . evidently
[goes] beyond the reach of Judicial cognizance.”110
These are also, of course, questions of considerable importance today.
Recent decisions seem, at least at first blush, and quite possibly even after
considered assessment, to have reversed directions, breathing new life into
federal power at the expense of the states.111 We can and should debate the
extent to which recent decisions have in fact altered the federal balance.112 We
can also argue about whether the political process model is an appropriate
approach to such matters.113 The point here, of course, is that M’Culloch has a

107. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 MADISON’S
WRITINGS, supra note 61, at 447, 452–53.
108. Id. at 449.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Compare, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (sustaining Congressional
abrogation of state immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in cases
involving access to the courts), with Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (rejecting ADA abrogation under Title I in cases seeking money damages
for disparate treatment). For an excellent recent discussion of the cases and apparent
contradictions, see Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2004).
112. For one example of the debate, compare Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s Power
Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731
(2002), with Ronald J. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence:
An Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 795 (2002).
113. Compare, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000), and Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as
a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001), with Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A.
Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001), and

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

768

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:749

great deal to say about all of this. As it does about a number of other matters
that arose then and are in many instances debated now.
The nature of this project makes it essential that I note only briefly some of
the many issues that make the decision especially noteworthy given the
situation at the time it was decided. One of these, the long-standing debate
about whether a federal program of internal improvement was constitutional,
would ironically arise almost immediately and play itself out in ways that
seemed to contradict what the Court held in M’Culloch.
The debate about internal improvement focused on whether the federal
government had the authority to engage in a wide spectrum of public-works
projects viewed as essential to the development of the emerging nation. With a
few very specific exceptions,114 this too became an argument about the extent
to which the power to act could be inferred where no express provision
authorizing it could be found.115 But unlike the Bank, internal improvement
never gained the Court’s imprimatur. One member of the Court, Justice
William Johnson, did maintain in a letter to President Monroe that the
members of the Court were “of [the] opinion that the decision on the Bank
question completely commits them on the subject of internal improvement, as
applied to Postroads and Military Roads.”116 But the Court itself has never
directly addressed the question and never accepted the argument. Of course,
there is now a massive federal presence in myriad programs that accomplish
the same ends as those proposed, but largely rejected, during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But these programs accomplish
these goals by indirection, largely through the spending process. Indeed, they
do so in ways that, at least as matters now stand, arguably compromise much
more deeply the sovereignty of the states.117
We can also tie M’Culloch to the then-simmering, soon to explode debate
about slavery. The first congressional discussions of the admission of
Missouri to the union as a slave state were held in the weeks just before
M’Culloch was decided. The South harbored deep concerns about the ability
of Congress to condition admission on an end to slavery and bar slavery from
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001).
114. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (granting Congress the power to “establish Post
Offices and post Roads”).
115. I discuss the internal improvement debate in Killenbeck, supra note 51, at 11737. For a
definitive history of these matters, albeit one that does not devote as much attention to the
constitutional matters as it might, see JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT:
NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS, AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY
UNITED STATES (2001).
116. Letter from Justice William Johnson to President James Monroe (undated), quoted in 1
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 59697 (2nd ed., 1926).
117. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (sustaining a federal measure that
required the state to raise its drinking age as a condition of receiving federal highway funds).
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national territories. Neither power was mentioned in the Constitution. But
both would, presumably, fall within the ambit of any expansive reading of the
text, in particular one sanctioning both the existence of implied powers and the
notion that such matters were best left to the political process. M’Culloch
accordingly struck fear into the hearts of the pro-slavery factions on both
counts. John Taylor’s editor would raise the alarm in his statement “To the
Publick,” observing that “[t]he crisis has come” and “[t]he Missouri Question
is probably not yet closed.”118 And Taylor himself would in turn argue against
any notion that the Court ought play a role in these matters, observing that “[a]
political balance of power, and a crusade against slavery, through the bowels
of the constitution, are two things so very distinct, that a thousand reasons
might be urged against their consanguinity.”119
M’Culloch is then a case for virtually all seasons, one that offers us the
opportunity to explore a substantial number of important constitutional
questions, only some of which are embedded within the opinion itself.
Competent, dedicated teachers of Constitutional Law do not need to do this.
The core holdings are sufficiently important, and their discussion sufficiently
interesting, to serve most pedagogical needs. But the wealth of opportunities
presented are certainly worth noting and, time permitting, pursuing.
IV. CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS OF M’CULLOCH
The second reason I find M’Culloch so compelling is that there are so
many human dimensions to the case that can be used to bring it, the
Constitution, and constitutional history alive. Many of these involve details of
the case that are not found in the report of the decision, much less in the
versions contained in the casebooks and the additional materials that appear
within them.
One aspect of the case that is generally recognized is that, at least at the
time M’Culloch was litigated, James William M’Culloh was, quite simply, a
crook (more of that shortly). Of course, the first thing worth noting is that he
was in fact James William M’Culloh. Mentioned only twice in the opinion
that now bears his name, the Court identifies him there as “the plaintiff in
error, McCulloch” and “James William McCulloch, the defendant below.”120
Seven years later, however, when the Court took up Etting v. The President,
Directors, and Company of the Bank of the United States,121 a case within
which M’Culloh is mentioned repeatedly in an action seeking to recover for
financial losses attributable to his actions, he is identified in yet another
manner, as one James W. M’Cullough.
118.
119.
120.
121.

TAYLOR, supra note 102, at i.
Id. at 293.
See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 31718 (1819).
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59 (1826).
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Commentators fare no better. Most histories identify him as McCulloch.122
But a number of original source documents use the spelling M’Culloh, and I
believe that this is the appropriate choice for a number of reasons. For
example, the individual who corresponded on behalf of the Baltimore branch
with Bank and government officials prior to M’Culloch was one James W.
M’Culloh. In a July 1817 letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, M’Culloh
urged legal action against another bank that had “no specie, stock, or notes of
other banks” and appeared to be in danger of defaulting on four notes owed the
Second Bank.123 That letter would prove to be at least ironic, if not prophetic,
when M’Culloh and two individuals with whom he formed a partnership,
James A. Buchanan and George Williams, were indicted in Maryland in July
1819 for the fruits of that undertaking, a massive scheme to defraud that cost
the Baltimore branch of the Bank in excess of $1.5 million.124
As indicated, rumors of these activities had begun to surface in late 1818
and were grist for many of the debates about the Bank that occurred prior to
and as M’Culloch was being argued.125 By May 1819 it was common
knowledge that massive acts of fraud had occurred at the Baltimore branch and
the Bank’s directors forced M’Culloh to resign. The July indictments
followed, and in two separate trials M’Culloh and his partners evaded justice.
At the first, which was held in Belle Air, Maryland in March and April 1821,
the indictments were dismissed, with two members of the court accepting the
defense argument that a conspiracy to defraud was neither a crime recognized
by statute in Maryland nor an offense at common law. In December 1821 that
verdict was reversed by the Maryland Court of Appeals, which remanded the
case for a trial on the facts.126 A second trial followed in March 1823. This
time M’Culloh and Buchanan were acquitted,127 and the indictment against
Williams was dismissed.128

122. See, e.g., WHITMAN H. RIDGWAY, COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP IN MARYLAND,
17901840, at 412 (1979) (index reference to “McCulloch, James W.”).
123. Letter from James W. M’Culloh to Wm. H. Crawford (July 19, 1817), in 4 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: FINANCE 80607 (Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1858). The spelling M’Culloh
appears consistently in these materials, and this is the first of the sources I believe dispositive in
this matter.
124. Much of the work involved in preparing the indictments was done by Luther Martin,
whose argument in M’Culloch was one of the last he made before the Court and whose work on
the indictments may have been the final blow in his rapidly deteriorating health. See PAUL S.
CLARKSON & R. SAMUEL JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 294303 (1970).
125. See supra notes 9798 and accompanying text.
126. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821).
127. The statements of the three judges announcing this result may be found in ROBERT
GOODLOE HARPER, A REPORT OF THE CONSPIRACY CASES LATELY DECIDED AT BELLE AIR,
HARTFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND (Baltimore, Thomas Murphy 1823) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE CONSPIRACY CASES]. Once again, the consistent spelling in this document is M’Culloh, and
this is the second source I believe important in resolving this matter. See id. at 24647
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These results almost certainly reflected a verdict against the Bank itself,
rather than a judgment that the three had not actually engaged in massive
fraud. M’Culloh and Buchanan’s strategy was simple. They argued that “they
relied too strongly on the hopes and calculations in which the whole
community indulged; but the failure of their stock speculations was rather to be
pitied as a misfortune, than condemned as a crime.”129 And, conveniently
glossing over the nature and scope of their own activities, they tried to shift
much of the blame to the Bank itself: “Its strange administration was an
incubus upon it, and was another cause of depreciation of its Stock, so that, in
fact, the Bank itself occasioned the losses upon which the present indictment is
founded.”130
In the wake of these events M’Culloh’s fortunes took a strange but perhaps
predictable turn.131 Initially and rightfully condemned—the trials were, for
example, moved to Belle Air in the belief that a fair trial could not be had in
Baltimore—he soon became a figure of respect. In 1825 he was elected to the
Maryland House of Delegates as a representative for Baltimore County. And
on December 26, 1826, the members of the House elected him Speaker of that
body.132 M’Culloh also began to practice law and again entered the world of
business. By the end of the decade he was recognized as one of the more
important political figures in the area. In the 1830s, in turn, he became an
influential lobbyist, working actively on behalf of the Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal Company in its pursuit of government support for both the canal and a
general program of internal improvement. He also pursued an active life of
community service. In 1837, for example, the legislature designated him as a
trustee of the Union Academy in Baltimore.
Thus, much like Richard Milhous Nixon, James William M’Culloh—who
was indeed a crook133—lived out his life until his death in 1861 a remade
individual, a successful politician, lawyer, and businessman. And this extra
dimension of M’Culloh’s story strikes me as especially apt for discussion when
teaching a case at a time when both government and corporate mis-, mal-, and
(statements of Judges Hanson and Williams); see also id. at 23346 (statement of Judge Dorsey,
dissenting).
128. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 500 (Md. Co. Ct. 1823).
129. REPORT OF THE CONSPIRACY CASES, supra note 127, at 113.
130. Id. at 170.
131. Discussions of M’Culloh’s life and, in particular, his criminal activities (with variant
spellings!) may be found in CATTERALL, supra note 95, at 4250 & 7879; BAYLY ELLEN
MARKS, HILTON HERITAGE 9-11 (rev. ed. 1993); RIDGWAY, supra, note 122, at 62, 105, 107 &
112; and David S. Bogen, The Scandal of Smith and Buchanan: The Skeletons in the McCulloch
v. Maryland Closet, 9 MD. L. F. 125 (1985).
132. JOURNAL OF THE MARYLAND HOUSE OF DELEGATES, DECEMBER SESSION, 1826, at 4.
Once again, M’Culloh, a third and final source cementing my belief that, while there are other
spellings in other documents, this is the appropriate choice.
133. Does “unindicted co-conspirator” count?
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nonfeasance have become important elements in the public debate about both
law and business.
There are other contextual realities that do not surface in the standard
treatments that add depth to the story. For example, oral arguments in the case
began on February 22, which, perhaps coincidentally, also happened to be
George Washington’s birthday.
That was something John Marshall,
Washington’s biographer, surely knew.134 It was also an ironic twist given
Washington’s role as the President whose acceptance of Alexander Hamilton’s
views on the matter of constitutionality allowed the First Bank to come into
existence. Indeed, the date resonated for a further reason, the fact that
Hamilton’s written opinion on the constitutionality of the First Bank was
completed in a final, frantic burst of activity that began on Tuesday, February
22, 1791, and concluded the following morning when he delivered the final
product to Washington.135
Given the compressed amount of time within which the Court then
worked, and a docket that included a number of other landmark cases,136 it is
unlikely that Marshall made a deliberate decision to select that date. Then
again, we will never know, and the coincidence, if indeed that is what it is, is
worth noting.
It is also of some interest that perhaps the most prominent champion of the
Bank before the Court, Daniel Webster, had just a few years earlier been one
of its staunchest opponents. In both 1815 and 1816, Representative Daniel
Webster spoke eloquently and at length on the House floor against both the
principle of a government bank and the details of the measures before him.137
In 1815, for example, Webster sarcastically described “a wonderful scheme of
finance” within which “[t]he government is to grow rich, because it is to
borrow without the obligation of repaying, and is to borrow of a bank which
issues paper without liability to redeem it.”138 Webster’s views would change.
When he appeared before the Court, the Bank was “a proper and suitable

134. Marshall included an extensive account of both the legislative and executive debates
regarding the First Bank in that biography. See 4 John MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 39097 & 49299 (2d ed., 1832) (Citizen’s Guild ed., 1926).
135. For an account of this process, and the frenzy of the final night, see RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35254 (2004).
136. For example, while argued in March, 1818, the Dartmouth College case had been carried
over to the February 1819 Term. The decision was announced on February 2, 1819, with the
Court holding that the charter creating the college was a contract protected by the Constitution.
See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). On February
17, in turn, the Court handed down its opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122 (1819), within which it held that a New York insolvency measure also violated the Contract
Clause.
137. See, e.g., HAMMOND, supra note 95, at 23839.
138. Clarke & Hall, supra note 77, at 56465 (statement on the House floor, Jan. 2, 1815).
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instrument to assist the operations of the government.”139 And his victory in
M’Culloch, like the one he secured just a few weeks earlier in the Dartmouth
College case, would do much to secure his reputation as one of the greatest
constitutional advocates of his age.
The assessments of the Bank rendered by another individual who was
center stage at the time M’Culloch was argued and decided are also worth
noting.
In the early months of 1819, Andrew Jackson was either a hero or a villain.
How one viewed him in large measure reflected how one judged his conduct as
commander of the forces that had subdued the Seminole Indians, who had
made a habit of raiding settlements in Georgia and then retreating to the
sanctuary of their villages in then Spanish Florida.140 Jackson’s role in what
became known as the First Seminole War had cemented his reputation with the
general public. But that popular response was arguably at odds with his actual
record in those events, which was decidedly mixed. He had indeed subdued a
tribe that President James Monroe characterized just prior to the expedition as
having “long violated our rights, & insulted our national character.”141 But
Jackson had also risked an international crisis with both England and Spain.
He had approved the execution of two British subjects accused of complicity in
the Seminole’s actions, in one instance overruling the court martial
recommendation that the accused be flogged and confined for one year at hard
labor. And while he fulfilled an unspoken goal of the administration by
invading and seizing Spanish Florida, he did so without formal authorization
and in a manner that could not help but embarrass the Spanish.
These matters were debated in Congress at length in January and February
1819, and a series of measures that contemplated Jackson’s censure were
soundly rejected. Whatever the misgivings many might have held about
Jackson’s actions—and they were both profound and in large measure
justified—Jackson himself felt vindicated. Leaving Washington in the wake of
the Congressional debate, ostensibly to visit his godson at West Point, he made
his way up the coast and was haled at virtually every step of the way. In New
York alone the celebrations lasted five days. And one of the highlights there
was a ball and supper held the same day that arguments in M’Culloch began,
February 22.
The intended purpose of the event was, of course, to honor the nation’s
most revered Founding Father on the occasion of his birthday. It was,
however, transformed by Jackson’s presence from an evening celebrating
George Washington’s life into one where “the opportunity was also embraced

139. M’Culloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, at 325 (1819).
140. For an extensive discussion of these matters, see Robert V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON
AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 1767-1821, at 34177 (1977).
141. Letter from James Monroe to Andrew Jackson (Dec. 28, 1817), quoted in id. at 34849.
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to honor the General” who, when he entered, “was saluted by a discharge of
artillery from a miniature fort raised on the orchestra.”142 It became then one
of a series of adulatory gatherings that would take Jackson back to his home
state of Tennessee and, eventually, to the White House. Thus, at that very
same time that the Court was considering and ultimately affirming the
constitutionality of the Bank, the people were deeply enmeshed in a social and
political process that would yield the President who would ultimately destroy
that institution.
Jackson characterized the Bank as “a ‘monster,’ a ‘hydra-headed’ monster,
a monster equipped with horns, hoofs, and tail and so dangerous that it
impaired ‘the morals of our people,’ corrupted ‘our statesmen,’ and threatened
‘our liberty.’”143 That hostility took concrete form in 1831 when he vetoed a
measure that would have extended the Bank’s charter. That then became the
foundation for subsequent actions that would ultimately lead to the demise of
the Bank in 1836. It is accordingly worthy of note that the fates of both—the
Bank and Jackson—were at issue in February and March 1819. And that the
Bank itself would on that occasion be saved by a judgment of the Court, an
institution that fell squarely within the ambit of Jackson’s apparent belief that
“the constitution is worth nothing, and a mere buble, except guaranteed to
them by an independent and virtuous Judiciary.”144
V. CONCLUSION
One of the many phrases for which M’Culloch is justly noted is Marshall’s
observation that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”145 Justice Frankfurter would describe this as “the single most
important utterance in the literature of constitutional law—most important
because most comprehensive and comprehending.”146 He was certainly correct
in believing that we should pay special attention to “the conception of the
nation which Marshall derived from the Constitution.”147 That vision came at
a critical juncture in the nation’s history. Marshall may well have already
outlined most of the principles that lie at the heart of M’Culloch in earlier
decisions. It was in M’Culloch, however, that Marshall brought the various
strands together. And it was in that decision that he invoked them in defense
142. 2 JAMES PARTON, LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 564 (1860) (quoting a contemporary
account).
143. ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR: A STUDY IN THE
GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 15 (1967) (quoting Jackson from various sources).
144. Letter from Andrew Jackson to Andrew J. Donelson (July 5, 1822), in 3
CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 167, 167 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1928).
145. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, at 407 (1819).
146. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219
(1955).
147. Id.
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of an institution whose combination of importance and flaws placed it center
stage in the development of the American nation for almost fifty years, from
the creation of the First Bank in 1791 to the demise of the Second in 1837.
M’Culloch is then a case within which both constitutional law and
constitutional history are important in ways few can duplicate. It is also a
decision whose story is one of triumphs and tragedies that transcend the metes
and bounds of the Constitution itself. Marshall’s admonitions regarding the
nature and scope of a constitution as a document are important and telling. But
the cases we teach in Constitutional Law courses are about something more
than the text itself. They are inquiries about and discussions of the structure of
a nation and the lives of the individuals who constitute it.
Narrowly understood, M’Culloch v. Maryland involves the Second Bank,
the sovereign State of Maryland, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the
Court. But it is also about the people who shaped it. These include Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison, whose visions of the nation and the Constitution
are competing but complementary, and John Marshall and Spencer Roane,
jurists with starkly different understandings of the role of the Court and the
prerogatives of the States. There are the advocates who appear before the
Court, men like Daniel Webster and Luther Martin. And there are the various
Presidents whose actions over the course of almost fifty years helped shape the
debate, in particular George Washington and Andrew Jackson, one of whom
brought the Bank to life with his signature, and the other of whom destroyed it.
Then there is James William M’Culloh himself. Most of us do not read
and certainly do not teach M’Culloch because we care about James M’Culloh
or the details of his life. Arguably, the Court needed neither that individual nor
the woes of the Baltimore branch to make its point. Maryland was not the only
state to enact steep taxes on the Bank, and it was only a matter of time before
some case of this sort came before Marshall and his colleagues. Indeed, a
strikingly similar one did arrive at the Court in 1824, albeit one we now read
for other reasons entirely.148 It is then one of the ironies of history that the
events that helped shape one of the most important constitutional decisions
ever issued by the Court came together in a case that bears James M’Culloh’s
misspelled name. And that irony, and the rise, and fall, and resurrection of
James M’Culloh, have a very great deal to do with how we can bring to life the
rich, sometimes contradictory, but always compelling threads that constitute
the full story of M’Culloch v. Maryland.

148. See Osborn v. The President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (184). Osborn is a staple in courses and casebooks on federal
jurisdiction, where we generally read and teach it as the first installment in our discussion of
federal question jurisdiction. Osborn does not, however, pop up in courses on Constitutional
Law; it is not even mentioned, much less included, in any of the casebooks that I have noted
during the course of this Essay.
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